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Brentanian Continua 
 
 
[to appear in Brentano Studien] 
 
Brentano’s mature theory of the continuum is developed at length in 
his Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum 
(Brentano 1976, English Brentano 1988), more specifically in the first 
treatise “On what is continuous” dictated in 1914, as well as in his 
Kategorienlehre (Brentano 1968, English Brentano 1981). More cursory 
presentations of his account are found in his 1917 essay “Vom ens 
rationis” (Brentano 1959: 238-281; English Brentano1995), in his 
Deskriptive Psychologie (Brentano 1982, English Brentano 1995b), in 
his Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie (Brentano 1979), in Von 
Sinnlichen und Noetischen Bewusstsein (Brentano 1928, English 
Brentano 1981a) and in his manuscript “Vom Unendlichen” (Brentano 
1963). One also finds an earlier detailed presentation of Brentano’s 
reflections on the continuum in his Lectures on Elementary Logics given 
in 1884/1885 (Ms. Y 2, Y 3, Die elementare Logik und die in ihr nötigen 
Reformen, ed. C. Ierna, to appear). 
Brentano’s theory of continuity is based on his account of boundaries. 
The core idea of the theory is that boundaries and coincidences thereof 
belong to the essence of continua. Brentano is confident that he 
developed a full-fledged, boundary-based, theory of continuity1; and 
scholars often concur: whether or not they accept Brentano’s take on 
continua they consider it a clear contender. My impression, on the 
contrary, is that, although it is infused with invaluable insights, several 
aspects of Brentano’s account of continuity remain inchoate. To be clear, 
the theory of boundaries on which it relies, as well as the account of 
ontological dependence that Brentano develops alongside his theory of 
boundaries, constitute splendid achievements. However, the passage 
from the theory of boundaries to the account of continuity is rather 
                                                
1In a letter presumed to be a recommendation for Rhees, Kastil however reports the 
following:  
[Brentano] indicated to me a few days before his death that his theory 
[of continuity] was in a process of alteration, without giving any further 
indication of the kind of improvements which he had in mind. (Letter 
quoted by Erbacher and Schirmer 2017).  
 
sketchy. This paper pinpoints some chief problems raised by this 
transition, and proposes some solutions to them which, if not always 
faithful to the letter of Brentano’s account of continua, are I believe 
faithful to its spirit. 
§1 presents Brentano’s critique of the mathematical account of the 
continuous. §2 introduces Brentano’s positive account of continua. §3 
raises three worries about Brentano’s account of continuity. §4 proposes 
a Neo-Brentanian approach to continua that handles these worries. 
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1.  Brentano against mathematical accounts of the 
continuous 
1.1.  Against constructions 
According to the standard mathematical approaches to continuity of 
Dedekind, Cantor or Poincaré, continua consist of non-denumerable 
infinities of “point-individuals” (Dedekind 1901), which are constructed 
through successive insertions of numbers. Put simply, one starts with the 
infinitely many integers, in between which one inserts the rational 
numbers, in between which one inserts the irrational numbers.  
An objection that Brentano raises against this approach to continuity 
pertains to “the origin of the concept of the continuous”. True to his 
empiricism, Brentano maintains that the concept of continuity is, like 
any other concept, not possessed innately but acquired through 
perception. There are then only two ways to acquire a concept: either by 
abstracting marks given in perception, or by combining marks given in 
perception.  
The difference between these two ways of acquiring a concept is this. 
Abstraction from intuition is a non-combinatorial process: to abstract 
something, e.g. redness, from perceptual intuitions, one has to consider 
various intuitions with this content, and contrast them with other 
intuitions lacking it, so as to make their differentiating feature(s) salient:  
As with other concepts gained not through combination of 
various marks but through abstraction from a unitary intuition 
—as for example the concept of what is coloured—we have 
only to bring forward different intuitions which all contain the 
relevant mark and then perhaps, in order still more to draw 
attention to the crucial point, contrast these with others where 
this mark is either entirely absent or at least given only in a 
noticeably different way. (Brentano 1988, 7)  
In constructionist explanations, by contrast, one does not just extract the 
relevant features from the content of our perceptions, but one also 
intervenes on them, by combining them in various ways. 
The mathematical approach to continuity is an account of the 
constructionist sort: it constructs the concept of continuity by successive 
interpolations of natural numbers. But, as Brentano notices, this 
mathematical approach is not the only constructionist account of 
continuity. Another view is that continua “can be divided in infinitum” 
(this contrasts with the view that continua consist of “infinitely many 
parts”). This second constructionist approach equates continua with what 
(following Lewis 1991) is nowadays called “gunk” or “atomless gunk”: 
infinitely divisible objects lacking indivisible parts, in particular point-
sized parts.  
  
 
Figure 1:  Ways of acquiring the concept of continuity 
 
There are two essential differences between the gunk approach and the 
intercalation approach:  
1. While the intercalation approach is committed to continua 
consisting of actual infinities of elements, the gunk approach only 
appeals to the modal view that continua can possibly be divided in 
infinitum.  
2. While the mathematical approach appeals to (infinitely many) 
point-sized objects, the gunk approach rejects point-sized objects 
on the ground that they are indivisible.  
Brentano raises several objections against each of these two 
constructionist approaches. On the whole, he considers the gunk 
approach more promising than the mathematical approach, as it isn’t 
committed to actual infinities, or to point-individuals. But he raises one 
objection meant to rebut them both, as well as any other possible 
constructionist account. Precisely because they are constructionist, such 
approaches render the concept of continuity too technical and 
inaccessible to intuition:  
we should have to ascribe to the concept of continuity an 
origin in operations of thought both artificial and involved. 
This seems unacceptable from the very start, for how could 
this concept then be found in the possession of the simple man 
or even of the immature child?  (Brentano 1988, 4).  
Given that the concept of continuity is understood pre-theoretically, 
construction is to be excluded and this concept can only be attained 
through abstraction.  
A second reason why constructionist approaches are “artificial and 
involved” is that continuity, Brentano insists, is presented in all of our 
intuitions:  
every single one of our intuitions—both those of outer 
perception as also their accompaniments in inner perception, 
and therefore also those of memory—bring to appearance 
what is continuous. (Brentano 1988, 6) 
no intuition is entirely free of the concept of that which is 
continuous. (Brentano 1988, 9)  
Since continuity is given in perception, there is no need to construct it:  
what is continuous must be given to us in individual 
intuition and must therefore have been abstracted therefrom. 
(Brentano 1988, 5) 
this concept is gained not through any intricate process of 
combination but rather in immediate fashion through simple 
abstraction from our intuition. (Brentano 1988, 6)  
Before turning to Brentano’s positive, anti-constructionist account of 
continuity, I want to rebut a common interpretation of the dispute 
between Brentano and the constructivists, to the effect that they are in 
fact not so much disagreeing as targeting different explananda. 
1.2.  A misunderstanding?  
In their introduction to the Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, 
Zeit und Kontinuum, Kölner and Chisholm argue that Dedekind, Cantor 
and Poincaré, on the one hand, and Brentano, on the other, do not after 
all hold incompatible views (Baumgartner & Simons 1994 concurs). 
Instead, they target different concepts of continuity. While Dedekind, 
Cantor and Poincaré are after the idealized continua central to 
mathematics, Brentano tries to understand the phenomenological 
continua of interest to descriptive psychology. Thus, for Kölner and 
Chisholm, no real disagreement is to be found here. On this reading, 
Brentano must have overestimated the range of his critique: its upshot is 
not that the mathematical approach to continuity is false, but only that it 
is false as an account of phenomenal continuity. Since phenomenal 
continuity was clearly not the explanandum for Dedekind, Cantor or 
Poincaré, they and Brentano can live together in peace. 
This attempt to reconcile Brentano with his opponents by restricting 
the scope of their respective theories is made more plausible by the fact 
that, on the face of it, Dedekind’s and Brentano’s pre-theoretical 
characterisations of continuity have little in common. While Dedekind 
explicitly characterises continuity in terms of “completeness”, “absence 
of gap” and “unbroken connection” (Dedekind 1901, 4-5), Brentano 
takes the main pre-theoretical feature of the concept of continuity to be 
that it is related to the concepts of “boundary” and “coincidence of 
boundaries”:  
the concept of a boundary and the possibility of a 
coincidence of boundaries is essential to the concept of what 
is continuous. (Brentano 1988; see also 4-5, 40, 42; Brentano 
1982, 112). 
He who does not show how we arrive at these ideas 
[boundaries and the possibility of their coincidence] is not, 
either, allowed to flatter himself with having sufficiently 
clarified the idea of the continuous (Brentano 1988: 6)  
Kölner and Chisholm’s conciliatory proposal seems to be vindicated: 
Brentano is after an empirical concept of continuity, whose core features 
involve coincidences of boundaries, while Dedekind, Cantor, Poincaré 
and others are attempting to shed light on an idealized concept of 
continuity, whose key feature is gaplessness.  
Appealing as this irenic picture may be, it is, I believe, erroneous. 
Brentano and Dedekind, are not talking past each other, but actually 
disagreeing. First, Brentano not only thinks that he is in disagreement 
with the classical mathematical approach to the continuum, he in fact 
argues that there is genuine disagreement here. Thus, he stresses from 
the very beginning of his investigations into the continuum that there 
must be a single concept of continuity that we all share, which constitutes 
the subject-matter of such disagreements:  
The question concerning the concept of continuity cannot 
be framed in such a way that one would call into doubt 
whether we do in fact possess such a concept. For otherwise 
we would not be able to understand ourselves when arguing 
about other aspects of this concept. (Brentano 1988, 1; see 
also Brentano 1981b, 55)  
Second, as the rest of his discussion makes clear, some of Brentano’s 
objections target not only the application of the mathematical approach 
to continuity to the simple contents of perception, but also to the 
“number-continuum” itself (a point further documented by Ierna 2012). 
What Brentano sets out to uncover is what all continua —sensory and 
mathematical— have in common. Note also that Dedekind would also 
not welcome a restriction of his enterprise to pure mathematical 
continua, since he explicitly states that he intends to lay the “scientific 
basis for the investigation of all continuous domains” (Dedekind 1901, 
5). 
For these reasons, Kölner and Chisholm’s proposal should be 
rejected: Brentano and the mathematicians are not after different species 
of continua but rather the same continuum-genus. They indeed differ in 
the paradigmatic examples they focus on, but they nonetheless share the 
same explanandum. 
How then is the concept of continuity they are disagreeing about to 
be characterised, prior to their disagreement?  If one is to disagree about 
continuity, one must agree on some topic-neutral identification of it. I 
suggest that Dedekind’s pre-theoretical characterisation of continuity in 
terms of gaplessness, —which is also the standard way in which 
continuity is described (Bell 2005)— is in fact also the characterisation 
Brentano relies on: that which is continuous has no gaps. When 
Brentano insists that the coincidence of boundary is the essential feature 
of a continuum, he is providing an opinionated account of it, not 
characterising continuity in a topic-neutral way. Although Brentano is 
less explicit about this, he, like Dedekind subscribes to the view that 
gaplessness is essential to continuity and should be accounted for. In his 
Lectures on Elementary Logics, he frequently characterises continua as 
gapless (lückenlos). Later on, the assumption that gaps threaten continua 
surfaces in several places in his writings (Brentano 1995a, 77, 112, 114). 
Coincidence of boundaries, in Brentano’s proposal, is precisely what 
explains gaplessness. Gaplessness therefore constitutes the 
explanandum common to Dedekind and Brentano.2   
                                                
2If this is right, then, Brentano’s objection to the constructionist approaches on behalf 
of their neglecting boundaries is question-begging:  
One sees that in this entire putative construction of the concept of 
what is continuous the goal has been entirely missed; for that which is 
above all else characteristic of a continuum, namely the idea of a boundary 
in the strict sense (to which belongs the possibility of a coincidence of 
boundaries), will be sought after entirely in vain. (Brentano, 1988, 4) 
He who does not show how we arrive at these ideas [the peculiarity 
of boundaries and the possibility of their coincidence] is not, either, 
Hence Brentano and Dedekind agree about what is to be explained, 
but they disagree about how to explain it. Where does their disagreement 
lie?  To put it crudely, for Dedekind the difference between a continuous 
and a discrete object is that in the former all gaps have been filled, thanks 
to the intercalation of new “point individuals”. The way to fix gaps is by 
filling them up. For Brentano, on the other hand, the difference lies in 
the fact that, in continuous objects, the absence of gaps is guaranteed by 
the coincidences of the boundaries of the subparts of this object. Joining 
together is the remedy against gaps —an idea that Brentano takes from 
Aristotle’s account of continuous quantities (Categories, 4b24-5a14). 
Compare:  
And if we knew for certain that space was discontinuous 
there would be nothing to prevent us, in case we so desired, 
from filling up its gaps, in thought, and thus making it 
continuous; this filling up would consist in a creation of new 
point-individuals (Dedekind 1901, 6) 
it belongs to the nature of a continuum that its parts are in 
contact with each other as boundaries (Brentano 1988, 42)  
Asked to fix a hole in a pie shell, Dedekind adds a tiny bit of pastry so 
as to fill the hole; Brentano’s brings the sides of the hole closer so as to 
make them slightly overlap3 . 
2.  Brentano’s account of continua 
What then is Brentano’s positive account of the continuous?  For 
simplicity’s sake, and following Brentano’s lead, we shall here focus on 
one species of continua: spatial continua which are uniformly or 
gradually coloured. Brentano in fact considers such continua to be not 
only secondary—in a sense to be introduced — but also fictitious for 
three reasons:  
                                                
allowed to flatter himself with having sufficiently clarified the idea of the 
continuous.(Brentano, 1988, 6)  
This objection is a petitio principii: the necessity of appealing to boundaries to explain 
gaplessness is precisely what Brentano should (and elsewhere does) argue for. 
Continuity or gaplessness does not obviously involve the concept of boundaries —
boundary-free accounts of continuity are not excluded from the start. 
Brentano errs, therefore, not when he sees himself as disagreeing with the 
mathematicians about continuity —pace Kölner and Chisholm— but when he readily 
assumes that boundary-free accounts of continua must miss the point.  
3One limit of this metaphor is that both Dedekind’s added bit of pastry and Brentano’s 
slight overlap, however thin, still have some thickness, which is not the case with 
Dedekind’s points or Brentano’s boundaries. 
1. He thinks that time, rather than space, is the only fundamental —
primary— continuum;  
2. He denies that colours exist outside the mind;  
3. He denies that continuous transitions between colours are possible 
—continuous transition between colours are “only apparent” 
(1981: 70) for intermediate colours such as purple are in fact 
chessboards made of small blue and red tiles, so that change from 
one simple colour to another can “only be sudden” (1981: 75 —
see Massin  & Hämmerli 2017 for discussion).  
This notwithstanding, Brentano explicitly allows himself to appeal to 
uniformly or gradually coloured areas as heuristic examples to shed light 
on continua in general. Thus, although such cases do not strictly 
speaking exist, Brentano holds that it is nevertheless fruitful to:  
1. Fictitiously treat space as a primary continum (1988: 27);  
2. Fictitiously treat colours as real (1995: 17-20);  
3. Fictitiously treat transitions between colours as continuous 
transitions (1988: 24; 1981: 70, 75).  
One chief reason why such fictitious assumptions are fruitful is that they 
allow us to easily depict various kinds of continua: in the Brentanian 
didactic set up of colours spread over regions, continuous variation 
between colours represent motion across time in the real world. Since 
colours in space are more easily depicted on a page than changes over 
time, the various forms of continua and their features can be captured at 
a glance. 
Brentano’s account of boundaries and continuity has been the object 
of several presentations and formalizations, in particular: Rhees (in 
Erbacher 2017), Chisholm 1992, Baumgartner 1994, Zimmerman 
1996a, Libardi 1996, Smith 1997, Bell 2000, Bell 2005, Albertazzi 2006, 
Poli 2012, Zelaniec 2017. The only two novelties of the following 
presentation are (i) it includes the main colour-figures that Brentano 
introduces as examples and (i) it explicitly hinges on the many kinds of 
ontological dependencies appealed to by Brentano (namely existential, 
essential, generic, individual, unilateral and reciprocal dependencies). 
2.1.  Existential dependence: boundaries 
The central features of Brentano’s approach that differentiate it from the 
standard mathematical approach are his use of the concept of boundary 
and his concomitant refusal to use point-individuals. Spatial boundaries 
—and correspondingly, continua— come in three varieties (1988: 10)4:  
1. points, which bound lines. Lines are “one-dimensional continua”, 
for their boundaries —points— are not themselves continuous.  
2. lines, which bound surfaces. Surfaces are two-dimensional 
continua, for their boundaries —lines— are one-dimensional 
continua.  
3. surfaces, which bound bodies. Bodies are three-dimensional 
continua, for their boundaries —surfaces— are two-dimensional 
continua.  
Like the point-individuals of Dedekind, boundaries have no thickness 
(points are indivisible in all directions, lines and surfaces are indivisible 
along the dimension in which they lack thickness). The difference 
between point-individuals and boundaries, though, is that whereas point-
individuals are independent beings –traditionally called substances— 
boundaries are existentially dependent entities. Boundaries cannot exist 
in and of themselves: they existentially depend on their insides, on what 
they bound:  
But just as it is certain that there are boundaries and that 
they must be included among things, it is also certain that a 
boundary is not a thing existing in itself. The boundary could 
not exist unless it belonged as a boundary to a continuum. 
(1981: 128, see also 1981: 20, 1995b: 357, 1988: 173)5   
This constitutes, in Brentano’s eyes, a further reason to reject 
mathematical accounts of the continuous:  
a cutting free from everything that is continuous is for 
[boundaries] absolutely impossible. And this allows us to 
grasp very clearly the topsy-turvy character of the above-
mentioned attempt at construction of the concept of the 
continuous through interpolation of fractional numbers, 
                                                
4Compare Aristotle, Categories, 4a24-5a14. 
5One complication to be ignored here is that, although every point is dependent on a 
continuum, the continuum it depends on need not be real. Take the present: since 
Brentano is a presentist and maintains that the present is boundary-dependent on the 
past and on the future, he has to maintain that boundaries can depend on continua that 
are not real, that have no being. This is also true, Brentano claims, of some spatial 
points, although the possibility of a spatial point depending on non-real continua is 
rarer (see 1995b: 357). This later claim however stands in tension with his other (and 
more numerous) claims to the effect that destroying the parts adjacent to a boundary 
modifies its plerosis (see the next sub-section). 
where every fraction is supposed to have existence without 
belonging to a series of fractions (1988: 10)  
Mathematical accounts of continua, in other words, hypostatize 
boundaries. Boundaries depend on the continua that they bound, but 
mathematical constructions of the continuous treat them as independent 
bricks out of which something could be constructed. 
2.2.  Essential dependence: plerosis and teleosis 
The dependency of boundaries on continua is even tighter, for 
boundaries depends on the continua they bound not only for their 
existence, but also for their very nature:   
the nature of the boundary is conditioned and determined 
by the distinctive properties of the continuum. (1981: 56, see 
also 60, 64n —on the distinction between existential and 
essential dependence at play here, see notably Correia 2008a).  
What aspects of the nature of boundaries depend on what they bound? 
Brentano introduces two essential features of boundaries, their plerosis 
and teleosis, both of which come in greater or lesser degrees, and are 
determined by the kind of continua that the boundaries bound.  
2.2.1.  Plerosis 
The plerosis of a boundary corresponds to the number of directions in 
which it bounds (1981: 128; 1988: 11; Brentano 1995b, 157). The 
concept of a boundary’s plerosis is easily grasped by contrasting inner 
and outer boundaries. A side of a red rectangle is an outer boundary, and 
only has half plerosis, for it bounds only towards the inside of the 
rectangle. A parallel line inside the rectangle is an inner boundary that 
has full plerosis, for it bounds in two opposite directions: on the left, and 
on the right. External boundaries are oriented: they so to speak “look 
inwards”. Internal boundaries look “all around”.  
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Boundary lines: full vs. half plerosis 
What is true of lines is also true of points. Consider the centre of a 
uniformly red disc. This centre has a full plerosis:  
Where we have to do with the interior of a continuum, 
every point has full plerosis, i.e. is connected in very 
conceivable direction with the relevant continuum. (1988: 28)  
Now suppose that one progressively removes sectors of a red disc (see 
Figure 3). The plerosis of the initial centre, Brentano holds, decreases as 
the process goes on: the point bounds in less and less directions (1981: 
128). 
  
 
Figure 3:  Boundary points: full vs. lesser plerosis 
Differences of plerosis are also found in the temporal realm. Thus, 
the end of a life bounds only towards the past: it has a lesser plerosis than 
an inner moment of a life, which is both a final and initial boundary. The 
same is true of the present itself, which constitutes the temporal 
continuum, and which bounds in two opposite directions: towards the 
past and towards the future. Thus, temporal boundaries can only have 
two degrees of plerosis: full plerosis —for inner boundaries of processes, 
and for the present itself— or half plerosis —which comes in two kinds: 
the half plerosis of initial and of final boundaries. 
2.2.2.  Teleosis 
The teleosis of a boundary, by contrast, corresponds to the velocity of 
change of the continuum it belongs to, at the point where the boundary 
stands within the continuum. One can thus think of the teleosis of a 
boundary in terms of instantaneous velocity. Consider two rectangles, 
both continuously progressing from red on the left to blue on the right, 
the middle of both rectangles containing various shades of purple. 
Suppose that one of these rectangles is twice as long as the other (Figure  
4). The velocity of colour-change will be twice as slow in the longer 
rectangle as in the shorter one. Brentano could have said that any vertical 
segment within the shorter rectangle is a boundary of a higher teleosis 
than any vertical segment within the longer rectangle. But he adopts the 
inverse convention:  
The greater the speed of the variation, the less the degree 
of teleosis. (1981: 129)  
Thus, the vertical boundaries making up the longer rectangle are said to 
have a higher teleosis than the boundaries of the shorter one.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Higher vs. lesser teleosis 
The boundaries we just been considering all have a constant teleosis, 
but it is also possible for a boundary to have a continuously changing 
teleosis. This is the case, for instance, with any spoke of a turning wheel. 
But we can also have cases of continuously changing teleosis with 
colours in space, as Brentano points out. Consider thus the radius of a 
continuously changing colour circle (see Figure 5): the farther we are 
from the centre, the higher the teleosis of the radius —the lower its 
instantaneous velocity.6   
  
 
Figure 5:  Boundary of continuously changing teleosis 
Finally, what is the teleosis of the boundaries in the two limiting 
cases: rest (analogous to boundaries within a red rectangle); and 
instantaneous motion (analogous to the boundary between a blue and a 
red rectangle)?  Brentano is not quite explicit about this, but the 
following two answers appear to follow from his proposal.  
• Rest. The inner boundaries of a uniformly red rectangle should be 
said to have the highest possible teleosis, for the velocity of 
colour-change is zero (colour is at rest, so to speak).  
                                                
6I pointed out that colour variations can be seen as standing for spatial motion in 
Brentano’s set up. However one shouldn’t be misled by the following disanalogy: on a 
real turning wheel, the farther we are from the center, the fasterr the motion; on a 
coloured wheel, however, the farther we are from the center, the slower the change 
between colours. 
• Instantaneous motion. In the case of quality “jumps”, by contrast, 
the boundaries should be said to have a plerosis, but no or a null 
teleosis. Brentano thus writes that adjacent red and blue tiles “are 
similar, not to teleosis, but to plerosis” (1981: 70). This can be 
understood in the following way: jumping immediately from one 
place (or quality) to another without going through intermediary 
places (or qualities) requires us to move with maximal speed. 
Since “The greater the speed of the variation, the less the degree 
of teleosis”, the teleosis should then be zero.  
2.3.  Reciprocal dependence: boundaries and 
continua 
None of what we have said so far addresses the nature of continua. On 
the contrary; boundaries have been introduced thanks to the continua on 
which they depend. How are we to move from the account of boundaries 
to an account of continua?  The first step is that boundaries belong to the 
continua on which they depend, so that boundaries are parts or 
constituents of continua. Because of this, continua depend in turn on the 
boundaries that constitute them:  
every boundary is ... a conditio sine qua non of the whole 
continuum […] the continuum is also a conditio sine qua non 
of the boundary. (1981: 56) 
Hence it would seem to be the case both that the 
continuum is conditioned by the boundary and also that the 
boundary is conditioned by the continuum. (1981: 128)  
This bi-lateral dependence between boundaries and continua is not 
entirely symmetrical, however. Brentano’s idea is that, while continua 
depend individually on the boundaries that constitute them, boundaries 
depend generically on the continua they constitute (a similar crossing of 
individual and generic dependence holds between qualities and locations 
according to Brentano, see Massin, 2017):  
it cannot be said of any definite continuum that it is a 
condition of the boundary, only a universal can be designated 
as a condition of the boundary. In other words, what is 
required is not this or that particular continuum, but any 
continuum of the approximate kind. (1981: 56; see also 157-
8, 201)  
2.4.  Coincidence of boundaries 
As tight as the interdependencies between boundaries might be, they will 
not by themselves guarantee gaplessness: dependency-relations are not 
spatial relations. Brentano’s chief way of avoiding gaps is by ensuring 
that the different parts of continua stand in contact with each other. To 
recall:  
it belongs to the nature of a continuum that his parts are in 
contact with each other as boundaries. (1988: 42)  
However, the possibility of contact has long been a source of paradoxes. 
One chief problem is this: either the boundaries of the bodies that are in 
contact do not occupy the same points in space, or they do. If the 
boundaries occupy different points in space, and if in between two points 
there are always further points, the bodies are not really in contact. If, on 
the other hand, the boundaries occupy the same points in space, then the 
bodies are not impenetrable for their boundaries coincide (see Kline & 
Matheson 1987 and Arntzenius 2007, §6 for more detailed presentations 
of the paradox). 
Brentano endorses a version of the later solution. Contact is for him 
the coincidence of boundaries: when two bodies are in contact some of 
their boundaries are at the same place at the same time (Brentano 1995b, 
357). Brentano however remains strongly committed to the 
impenetrability of bodies. How is that possible?  His idea is that 
impenetrability is compatible with the coincidence of the surfaces of the 
bodies. He also remains a fierce defender of the impenetrability of 
colours (see Massin & Hämmeli 2017 for discussion). But colour-
impenetrability requires only that the boundaries of the same body can 
never be at once red and blue. As long as boundaries of different colours 
bound different entities —that is, as long as they are of incomplete 
plerosis and depend on distinct continua— their coincidence does not 
violate impenetrability:  
If a red and a blue surface are in contact with each other 
then a red and a blue line coincide, each with different 
plerosis. (1988: 41) 
the geometer’s proposition that only one straight line is 
conceivable between two points, is strictly speaking false if 
one conceives the matter in terms of lines of incomplete 
plerosis whose pleroses, even though they coincide with one 
another, relate to different sides. (1988: 12)  
Such coincidences of boundaries, Brentano insists, are essential to the 
perception of continua:  
Certainly we cannot distinguish the individual points and 
boundaries in the continuum that presents itself to us […]. Yet 
this does not hinder us in apprehending with complete 
certainty that boundaries and coincidences of boundaries are 
numberlessly present in the whole in question. (Brentano, 
1988, 9, my italics)  
A problem may seem to arise in the case of inner boundaries, for, as we 
saw, Brentano claims that such boundaries have full plerosis:  
Where we have to do with the interior of a continuum, 
every point has full plerosis, i.e. is connected in every 
conceivable direction with the relevant continuum. (1988: 28)  
The problem is this. Consider the inner boundary in Figure 2. If such a 
boundary indeed has full plerosis, on what grounds are we to say that we 
have two coinciding boundaries here? The only reason why there should 
be two boundaries, instead of just one, is if each would bound in opposite 
directions. But here, instead of having two lines with half plerosis, we 
seem to only have one boundary with full plerosis. Internal contact, then, 
cannot consist in boundary-coincidence but must consist instead in some 
boundary-sharing: the right- and left-hand sides of our red rectangle 
would be in contact in virtue of having one boundary in common: the 
vertical line in the middle. In other words, in the case of internal 
boundaries, Brentano’s theory appears to face the following dilemma:  
1. Either internal boundaries (in contrast with external boundaries) 
have full plerosis, but then internal contact does not consist in 
boundary-coincidence but in boundary-sharing.  
2. Or internal contact (like external contact) consists in several 
coinciding boundaries, but then it is not the case that all internal 
boundaries have full plerosis.  
Does Brentano endorse the first horn of the dilemma?  I do not think so, 
for two reasons. 
First, as Zimmerman 1996a (who attributes a boundary-sharing 
account to Suarez) points out, the boundary-sharing account faces a 
quandary when it comes to breakage. Suppose we split our red rectangle 
into two halves. Since, under the present hypothesis, there was only one 
boundary in the middle of the rectangle, we are left with two unattractive 
options. Either the boundary stays with one of the new rectangles —but 
which one? — and a new boundary is created on the other rectangle —
ex nihilo? — or the inner boundary is destroyed and two boundaries are 
created, ex nihilo. Similarly, if the two rectangles are brought into 
contact again, one would have to say either that one boundary is 
destroyed and the other survives (which one?), or that the two boundaries 
are destroyed and a new one is created. Both options are equally 
unattractive. Of course, this dilemma doesn’t arise if, as per the 
boundary-coincidence account, we have two inner boundaries to start 
with before the breakage. Brentano comes close to this line of thought in 
the following passage:  
Dedekind believes that either the number 1/2 forms the 
beginning of the series 1/2 to 1, so that the series 0 to 1/2 
would thereby be spared a final member, i.e. an end point 
which would belong to it; or conversely. But this is not how 
things are in the case of a true continuum. Much rather is it 
the case that, when one divides a line, every part has a starting 
point, but in half plerosis. (1988, 40)  
The second reason not to attribute a boundary-sharing account of inner 
contact to Brentano, over and above the problems it raises, is quite 
simply that there is no textual evidence that Brentano intends to treat 
inner contact in a different way to external contact. On the other hand, 
there is clear evidence that he is willing to endorse a boundary-
coincidence account of both external and inner contact (this is also how 
Chisholm 1992 and Zimmerman 1996a interpret him). 
So, Brentano must embrace the second horn of the dilemma: inner 
contact, like external contact, consists in boundary-coincidence. But how 
is this view to be reconciled with the claim that “Where we have to do 
with the interior of a continuum, every point has full plerosis”?  I suggest 
that this sentence is slightly hyperbolic. Brentano should have said, more 
cautiously, that at every point in the interior of a continuum, there is a 
boundary with full plerosis. This more modest claim is interesting in that 
it does not rule out that, at every point in the interior of a continuum, 
there may also be boundaries with partial plerosis. Brentano explicitly 
recognises this elsewhere:  
In the case of a one-dimensional continuum these 
boundaries can be internal boundaries in two opposing 
directions and are then points of connection. But they can also 
be internal boundaries in merely one direction in relation to 
that which they bound, and in the other direction be external 
boundaries. They are then separating points, actually not one, 
but two of half plerosis which coincide. (1988, 108, italics 
mine)  
One may worry that, if we admit internal boundaries of partial and full 
plerosis, we end up with too many coinciding boundaries: at the middle 
line in our red rectangle one would find not only two boundaries with 
half plerosis, but also a third boundary with full plerosis. The answer to 
this worry lies in Brentano’s suggestion that coinciding boundaries may 
enter into part-whole relationships. Two inner coinciding boundaries of 
half-plerosis form together a boundary of full-plerosis. It is therefore not 
as if the inner boundary of full plerosis is a third, additional boundary 
coinciding with the two half-plerosis boundaries: rather, the third 
boundary is mereologically constituted by these two half-plerosis 
boundaries. Despite being spatially indivisible, some boundaries 
nevertheless have plerotic parts (talk of “plerotic parts” is not 
Brentano’s, but Smith 1997’s). 
Likewise, at the centre of our red disc lies as many boundaries of 
partial plerosis as there are radii and sectors of the discs. Taken together, 
all these coinciding points with partial plerosis form a unique point with 
full plerosis:  
Euclid’s supposition that a point is that which has no parts 
was seen already by Galileo to be in error when he drew 
attention to the fact that the mid-point of a circle allows the 
distinction of just as many parts as there are points on the 
circumference, since it differs in a certain sense as starting 
point of the different individual radii. (1988, 41)  
Brentano on the other hand, implies that coinciding external boundaries 
do not form a single boundary of full plerosis. Only coinciding inner 
boundaries of partial plerosis can be mereologically summed (Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6:  Mereology of Boundaries 
2.5.  One-sided dependence: primary and 
secondary continua 
A colour that fills a spatial area is a secondary continuum while the 
extension it fills is a primary continuum. Likewise, time is a primary 
continuum, while a constant or rising tone is a secondary continuum. 
Secondary continua therefore one-sidedly depend on primary continua: 
primary continua (e.g. space) “make possible” (1995a: 116) the 
continuity of secondary continua (e.g. single or varying colours).  
We come now to a very important respect in which to 
classify continuity. It is that which follows from the 
multiplicity of most if not all of what is continuous. Imagine, 
for example, a coloured surface. Its colour is something from 
which the geometer abstracts. For him there comes into 
consideration only the constantly changing manifold of 
spatial differences. But the colour, too, appears to be extended 
with the spatial surface, whether it manifests no specific 
colour-differences of its own—as in the case of a red colour 
which fills out a surface uniformly—or whether it varies in its 
colouring—perhaps in the manner of a rectangle which begins 
on one side with red and ends on the other side with blue, 
progressing uniformly through all colour-differences from 
violet to pure blue in between. In both cases we have to do 
with a multiple continuum, and it is the spatial continuum 
which appears thereby as primary, the colour-continuum as 
secondary. (1988: 21)  
Brentano maintains that, ultimately, time is the only primary continuum, 
but argues that space can nevertheless be treated as a primary continuum 
with respect to what fills it. Teleosis, as we saw, is strictly speaking a 
property of boundaries, but Brentano also talks of the teleosis of 
continua, by which he means the velocity of change of the continua. In 
more familiar terms, the teleosis of a boundary corresponds to 
instantaneous velocity, and the teleosis of a continuum corresponds to 
velocity of change over an interval of time. Brentano investigates at 
length how the concept of teleosis applies to primary and secondary 
continua respectively. One may initially think that primary continua lack 
teleosis: how can that against which the velocity of change is measured 
—time and space—itself have a velocity of change?  Brentano dismisses 
this worry. Since there are spatial and temporal variations, these 
variations must have a velocity: hence primary continua must also have 
teleosis. What he rejects, however, is that the rate of the variation of 
primary continua can change. In other word, the teleosis of primary 
continua must remain constant. Primary continua have a constant speed. 
They cannot accelerate:  
However, by ’velocity’ we are to understand in the end 
nothing other than the rate of variation, and certainly it cannot 
be denied that wherever variation exists, it must exist in some 
determinate degree or other, whether this be constant […] or 
now higher, now lower. In the case of time, now, there exists 
a variation. What should be denied is only that, like the degree 
of other variations, it could come to be lowered or raise. And 
something quite similar hols also of the spatial as such. (1988: 
23; see also 1963: 45).  
Secondary continua, by contrast, may have different teleosis: motions, 
or colour transitions, can accelerate (see Figure 7). 
  
 
Figure 7:  Constant vs. Varying teleosis 
This difference between the teleosis of primary and secondary continua 
leads Brentano to a refined objection to constructionist accounts of the 
continuum. Mathematicians have to agree that the velocity of the 
enumeration7 of fractional numbers between 0 and 1 can vary. Hence the 
                                                
7It might sound surprising to target the view that the number-continuum is defined 
through successive acts of counting, but this was indeed Dedekind’s proposal:  
I regard the whole of arithmetic as a necessary, or at least natural, 
consequence of the simplest arithmetic act, that of counting, and counting 
it- self as nothing else than the successive creation of the infinite series of 
positive integers in which each individual is defined by the one 
immediately preceding; the simplest act is the passing from an already-
formed individual to the con- secutive new one to be formed (Dedekind 
1901, 2)  
number-continuum must be a secondary-continuum, and therefore 
depends on a primary continuum, whose nature remains unexplained by 
mathematical accounts:  
From this it follows that the number-continuum which is 
supposed to have been produced would be in every case a 
secondary continuum which therefore included the idea of a 
primary continuum as previously given. And thus for this 
reason, too, it is apparent that what one supposed oneself able 
to gain by construction has already—without this being 
noticed—been presupposed as given. The contradictoriness of 
the whole enterprise thus comes to light once more in the most 
flagrant manner. (1988: 43).  
What if, instead of appealing to enumerations, constructionist 
mathematicians relied on the “co-existence” of all the numbers?  Then, 
Brentano retorts, one should be able to identify the precise degree of 
variation of the number-continuum. But any particular degree would 
seem arbitrary. 
To recap: continua are abstracted, not constructed. Their key 
ingredients are boundaries. Boundaries:  
1. have different plerosis —directions in which they bound;  
2. have different teleosis —instantaneous velocities;  
3. generically depend on the continua they bound;  
4. constitute continua: hence continua depend individually on 
boundaries.  
5. ensure the continuity of the continua they constitute by coinciding.  
I shall now raise three problems for Brentano’s account of continua. 
3.  Three problems for Brentano’s account 
3.1.  Can boundaries of primary continua 
coincide?  
Brentano’s theory of contact as coincidence of boundaries is quite 
plausible in the case of things that are in space, such as a blue and a red 
book touching each other on a surface, or a blue and a red square 
touching each other on a line. But can the boundaries that make up space 
itself coincide?  More generally, can the boundaries constitutive of 
primary continua coincide?  That the boundaries of two things in space 
                                                
 
may coincide is one thing, but that the boundary of two regions of space 
may coincide is quite another. For boundaries to coincide, several 
boundaries must be at the same place. But what would it mean for a 
boundary that constitutes space to be at a place?  How can the very 
boundaries making up space be located at places, since they are 
themselves constituent of places? We are basically saying that places are 
located at places. 
One may retort that location is a reflexive relation (Casati & Varzi 
1999, 21). Places can therefore be seen as located at themselves. But 
whatever its intrinsic merits (or problems), this proposal does not 
demonstrate the possibility of coincidence between the boundaries of 
primary continua. For even if places are located at themselves, this does 
not show that two places can be located at the same place. On the 
contrary: if places are (exactly) located at themselves, and if two places 
are exactly located at the same place, then they must be one and the same. 
To show this, we just need to make the additional assumption that places, 
if located, have only one exact location. One quick argument in favour 
of this assumption is that places are particulars, and particulars have only 
one exact location (contrary, perhaps, to universals). The argument to  
the effect that, if two places are located at the same place, then they are 
not distinct then proceeds as follows:  
(1) Coincidence: p1 and p2 are exactly located at a p3.  
(2) Reflexivity: p1 is exactly located at p1 . p2 is exactly located at p2 .  
(3) Unicity: Every place has exactly one exact location.  
(4) p1 is identical to p3. (from 1, 2, 3)  
(5) p2 is identical to p3. (from 1, 2, 3)  
(6) p1 is identical to p2. (from 4, 5)  
Thanks to reflexive location we may ‚find a way of holding that the 
boundaries constituting space are located, but we still do not get 
coincidence of boundaries. Summing up: either we hold that location is 
irreflexive, in which case two places can never be exactly located at the 
same place for the reason that places simply cannot be located. Or we 
accept the reflexivity of location, in which case two places cannot be 
exactly located at the same place for the reason that they fuse into one 
place. Either way, two places can never be located at the same place. The 
relation of coincidence, therefore, must hold between things which exist 
in space: it cannot hold between constituents of space. If this is right, any 
coincidence-based account of primary continua is doomed to fail.  
Note that Brentano himself objects to mathematical accounts of 
continua along quite similar lines. He repeatedly argues that the 
intercalation approach cannot account for primary continua because it 
presupposes them (1988, 3, 39, 40). Against Poincaré he presses the idea 
that to grasp the idea of intercalation –in particular the intercalation of 
transcendental numbers– we must already have the idea of some primary 
continua to be filled. If there is something to be filled, then there is an 
underlying primary continuum whose continuity is not to be explained 
in terms of intercalation.  
Now this worry backfires against Brentano’s own coincidence-
account: for coincidence to take place, there must be an underlying 
spatial continuum in which it takes place. Whether one fixes the hole in 
the pie shell by filling it —à la Dedekind— or by bringing its sides 
together —à la Brentano— one must be working on a continuous 
underlying pie plate, the continuity of which remains to be explained. 
3.2.  Do continua consist only of boundaries?  
The second problem for Brentano’s account of continua pertains to the 
constituents of continua: do continua consist only of boundaries, or do 
they contain another category of entity?  One strand in Brentano’s 
thought is that continua consist only of boundaries, so that saying that 
boundaries bound continua amounts to saying that boundaries bound 
multiplicities of boundaries. Already in 1885, Brentano maintained:  
ultimately, every continuum is constituted by infinitely 
many non-continuous boundaries. (Ms. Y 3: Die elementare 
Logik und die in ihr nötigen Reformen II, Vienna, 1884/1885, 
trans. by Ierna 2012) 
These non-extended boundaries are in a certain sense the 
ultimate physical parts of the continuum. The continuum 
ultimately consists in a multiplicity of non-extensional simple 
boundaries. (ibid.)  
(Of course, some boundaries —surfaces, lines— are continuous, but 
their ultimate boundaries —boundary points— aren’t. Hence Brentano’s 
claim that continua are ultimately constituted of non-continuous 
boundaries.) The idea is restated around 1890 in the Vienna lectures on 
descriptive psychology:  
Every continuum consists of nothing but boundary points. 
(Brentano 1982, 112)  
Likewise, in 1915:  
Indeed we can conceive [a continuum] as a continuous 
multiplicity of boundaries. (Brentano  1981b, 55)  
Finally, in On what is continuous, Brentano says that the spatial 
continuum “is in every one of its boundaries” (Brentano 1988, 114), and 
he equates boundaries with the “ultimate elements” (Brentano 1988, 
176) of continua.  
However, the view that continua consist merely of boundaries raises 
two problems:  
1. Brentano insists in various places that spatial continua, which he 
calls continuously many by contrast to continuously manifold 
continua, can be partly destroyed or modified without affecting the 
rest of the continuum (1981: 85, 157; 1988: 32-34). But if 
boundaries are essentially dependent on what they bound (in virtue 
of their plerosis and teleosis), and if what they bound are just other 
boundaries, then destroying one boundary of a continuum should 
end up modifying all the other boundaries of that continuum, 
however far apart they are. Continua end up being holistically 
unified in such a way that changes in one part affect all the other 
parts.  
2. More crucially, if coincidence is the only spatial relation between 
boundaries in a continuum, how can we get spatially extended 
continua from mere unextended boundaries? By transitivity of 
coincidence (Chisholm 1992, Smith 1997), all boundaries end up 
coinciding with each other. From unextended boundaries and 
coincidence alone, one never gets extension, be it temporal or 
spatial.  
Such problems suggest that Brentano’s theory requires an additional 
ingredient. As it happens, Brentano is not always clear about whether 
boundaries are the only constituents of continua. In his “Addendum to 
the treatise on what is continuous”, he says that boundaries “in 
conjunction make a contribution to the continuum.” (1988: 40, my 
italics), leaving it open whether other elements contribute to the 
continuum. In other passages, Brentano may appear to accept atomless 
gunk—extended substance, all of whose parts have proper parts– as he 
is committed to infinite divisibility:  
[the continuum] is made up to infinity of smaller and 
smaller parts, and again […] these touch each other in null-
dimensional boundaries, points, which would not be 
conceivable if there were nothing which they would bound. 
(Brentano 1988, 108; see also 1981, 46, 85; 1995b, 357)  
Thus, Zimmerman (1996b) argues that atomless gunk is another 
ingredient of Brentanian continua over and above boundaries (see also 
Zimmerman1996a and Chisholm 1992, 148)  He considers Brentano, 
together with Suarez, to be a leading upholder of “moderate 
indivisibilism”, the view that extended objects are made up of atomless 
gunk surrounded by skins of point-sized parts constituting a surface. Let 
us more explicitly refer to this view as the “bounded-gunk account”:  
bounded-gunk account: (i) Bodies are made up of gunk and of 
boundaries enclosing it. (ii) Gunk and boundaries are mutually 
dependent entities. More precisely (see 2.3.): the gunk that constitutes 
a body individually depends on the body’s boundaries, while the 
boundary of the body only depends generically on the gunk that 
constitutes it.  
The introduction of extended gunk on top of unextended boundaries 
paves the way for a solution the two problems raised above:  
1. That boundaries depend on different chunks of gunk rather than 
on other boundaries would put an end to the holistic regress of 
dependencies within a continuum —provided gunk is not itself 
essentially dependent on its boundaries.  
2. One no longer needs to get extension purely from unextended 
coinciding boundaries.  
As an added bonus, if we appeal to gunk we can dispense with actual 
infinities, for we are replacing infinities of parts with infinite divisibility. 
This fits with Brentano’s rejection of infinitum actu and acceptance of 
infinitum potentia (1995b: 362).  
Despite these advantages, it is doubtful whether Brentano really 
endorses the bounded-gunk account. His most positive remark about 
atomless gunk is that the idea is “not quite so absurd” as Dedekind’s idea 
of a magnitude consisting of infinitely many parts (1988: 5). Brentano 
then goes on to reject the idea of constructing continua thanks to 
                                                
8Smith (1997) also argues that Brentanian continua are not made up just of boundaries 
and contain some other extended ingredients.  
Concrete continua are in contrast made up of different sorts of parts; 
above all, they are made up of boundaries of different numbers of 
dimensions, on the one hand, and of extended bodies or regions which 
these boundaries are the boundaries of, on the other. (Smith 1997)  
Smith however remains unspecific about the nature of Brentanian bodies. They could 
be made of gunk, as per Zimmerman. But Smith’s claim is compatible with bodies 
being spatial continua (as Brentano assumes in various places), themselves to be 
analysed in terms of multiplicities of boundaries –which would drive us back to our 
present problem. 
atomless gunk. On top of his general objection to constructionist 
approaches introduced above, Brentano points out that the idea of an 
extended simple to which one ascribes continuity is conceptually 
consistent (1988:6). In support of this idea he mentions Democritus’s 
extended indivisible atoms and the idea that when we divide parts in our 
thoughts we arrive at certain limits. None of this prevents us from 
ascribing continuity to these indivisibilia, he suggests. He concludes that 
“being continuous and being divisible in infinitum are concepts that do 
not coincide in their content” (1988: 6). 
The bounded-gunk account raises two difficulties that may explain 
Brentano’s reluctancy:  
1. The kind of continuous phenomena that interests him the most are 
continuous transitions, such as colour gradients. But continuous 
variations and gunk do not make good bedfellows. Consider, as 
above, a rectangle whose colour varies horizontally, continuously 
from red to blue. Any determinate shade of purple will consist in 
a vertical line. Such a line is vertically indivisible, and hence has 
no extent. The colour shades of continuous transitions are thereby 
not made of extended gunk: we seem to have a continuum without 
extended gunk of any determinate colour (see Arntzenius and 
Hawthorne, 2005 for some attempts at reconciling gunk and 
continuous variations).  
2. Accepting gunk —or any other extended element— to fill 
boundaries commits one to the distinction between closed and 
open entities. For if bodies are bounded gunk, then one will have 
to say that gunk-minus-boundaries —or gunk-in-abstraction-
from-its-boundaries— is an open entity. However, such a 
Bolzanian distinction is highly problematic according to Brentano, 
who famously rejected it as “monstrous” (1988: 146-7).  
One may retort that the bounded-gunk account is in fact immune 
to Brentano’s objection to Bolzano. Brentano argues that on 
Bolzano’s view we end up with two kinds of bodies (open and 
closed), and that “contact would be possible only between a body 
with a surface and another without” (ibid). On the bounded-gunk 
account, in contrast, the open-closed distinction is not a distinction 
between two kinds of substances: bodies are all closed. The 
distinction is instead a distinction between bodies (which are all 
closed) and the gunk that constitutes them (which is open). Since 
Brentano has a compelling account of contact between bodies 
(namely, through coincidence of boundaries), no paradox arises in 
this respect: under the bounded-gunk account we have only one 
kind of body (closed bodies) and only one kind of contact 
(coincidence).  
While this is true, the bounded-gunk account still faces two 
problems.  
(a) The bounded-gunk account runs afoul of another major 
worry Brentano has about the open-closed distinction, 
namely that open entities —be they independent or 
dependent— begin without having any beginning point, 
which according to Brentano is absurd (1988: 41; Brentano 
1981b, 128n).  
(b) If the bounded-gunk account is true, one has to account for 
the contact between boundaries and their insides (Varzi 
1997): any gap between the skin and the flesh would 
endanger continuity. On the bounded-gunk account there is 
indeed only one mode of contact between bodies, but the 
contact between the mutually dependent entities 
constitutive of bodies –gunk and boundaries– remains 
unexplained. Brentano nowhere mentions this sort of 
contact in his extensive discussion of the continuous, 
making it dubious that he endorses the bounded gunk 
account.  
Wrapping up, Brentano’s account of continua faces an unattractive 
dilemma:  
• Either continua consist entirely of boundaries, but then (1) it is 
impossible to destroy any part of a continuum without modifying 
all the rest of it (due to the essential dependence of boundaries); 
and (2) extension becomes impossible (due to transitivity of 
coincidence and the view that continuity can only stem from 
coincidence).  
• Or continua consist of atomless gunk surrounded by a bounding-
skin, but then (1) continuous transitions are hard to accommodate; 
(2) some entities —open gunk, that is, gunk in abstraction from its 
boundary— begin without having any beginning point. Further, 
the contact between the skin of the bodies and their gunky interior 
remains unaccounted for.  
3.3.  What is the plerosis of boundaries within 
a continuous transition?  
The third problem for Brentano’s account of continua pertains to 
continuous transitions. What are we going to say about the plerosis of 
inner boundaries within a continuous colour transition, such as any 
vertical line within the red-to-blue rectangle above?  In how many 
directions do such boundaries bound? Brentano does not explicitly 
consider this question, but there seem to be two available answers, each 
of which proves equally problematic.  
1. Because none of the immediate neighbours of each inner boundary 
within a continuous transition have the same colour, it seems 
natural to ascribe a null degree of plerosis to such transitory 
boundaries: they bound in no direction. But this seems to 
contradict the nature of a boundary: in what sense is a boundary 
that bounds in no direction still a boundary?9   
2. On the other hand, since the inner boundaries of a continuous 
transition do not mark any qualitative ruptures (by contrast with 
the red-blue coinciding lines discussed above), one may be 
tempted to ascribe to them the highest degree of plerosis. It may 
seem indeed that such boundaries bound in all conceivable 
directions (left and right).  
This second answer is equally problematic. If a full plerosis is 
ascribed to transitory colours within continuous transitions, then 
the intuitive contrast between such boundaries and the inner 
boundary of a uniformly violet rectangle is lost. The inner 
boundaries of a uniformly red rectangle are ascribed the maximal 
degree of plerosis because they all have neighbours of exactly the 
same colour. So, when all neighbours are qualitatively distinct, as 
is the case with inner boundaries within continuous transitions, 
they should have a lesser degree of plerosis, on pain of losing the 
contrast between the two cases. To illustrate, suppose we hold 
fixed the colour of the violet line in the middle of the blue-to-red 
rectangle and that we progressively colour the rest of the rectangle 
with the same determinate shade of violet (Figure 8). Wouldn’t the 
                                                
9One may reply that having a null plerosis is distinct from having no plerosis. However, 
whatever one’s take on zero-value quantities, there are reasons to believe that the 
distinction between zero-value vectorial quantities and absences of vectorial quantities 
is a distinction without a difference (Massin 2016, §5.3). Indeed, it is far from clear 
what a null direction could mean: what would a boundary that bounds in direction 0 
bound?  
plerosis of this line thereby become more complete?  But how is 
this possible if it was already bounding in all directions?   
 
Figure 8:  Plerosis and continuous transition 
4.  A Neo-Brentanian Account: varieties of 
continuity 
These three problems, I shall argue, originate in one tacit assumption 
made by Brentano: that all forms of continua —primary continua such 
as space and secondary continua such as coloured space— call for the 
same sort of account. While Brentano distinguishes different kinds of 
continua, he assumes they must all exhibit the same sort of continuity. I 
propose rejecting this assumption: there are different kinds of continua, 
and they exhibit different kinds of continuity. 
Brentano’s coincidence account of continuity nicely explains the 
continuity of concrete secondary continua, that is, the continuity of 
extended things that are in space or in time: two parts of a uniform 
coloured shape, two shapes of different colour, two parts of a life, two 
lives, etc., are continuous with each other in virtue of the coincidence of 
their boundaries.  
However, two other sorts of non-secondary continua call for 
explanation, but cannot be explained in terms of boundary-coincidence:  
1. The continuity of primary continua –space and time themselves–
cannot be explained in terms of boundary-coincidences for the 
reasons advanced above. 
2. The continuity of any space that abstracts from spatial and 
temporal determinations e.g. the colour space.  
I shall argue that the continuity of these two sorts of continua –primary 
continua and abstract secondary continua– for which boundary-
coincidence is excluded, can and should be explained in a different way, 
namely by introducing a primitive relation of continuity.  
4.1.  Primary continua: primitive continuity 
Coincidence of boundaries, although crucial to understanding contact 
and continuity between things that exist in space —or in time— is of no 
help when it comes to understanding the continuity of primary continua 
themselves. Because coincidence can only occur in secondary continua, 
the continuity of primary continua is not coincidence-based. The scope 
of the coincidence-account of contact and continuity should be 
restricted: it applies only to things that exist in space (e.g. colour shapes) 
or in time (e.g. parts of one’s life).  
This contradicts Brentano’s repeated claim that the possibility of 
coincidence belongs to the nature of continua: on the present proposal, 
only secondary continua can be explained through boundary-
coincidence. But as we shall see, abandoning the possibility of 
coincidence for primary continua paves the way for an arguably even 
more Brentanian account of primary continua.  
How should we account for the continuity of primary continua, if not 
by boundary coincidence?  Brentano does hint at an alternative account 
of continuity. The continuity of primary continua, Brentano seems to 
suggest, consists in a primitive continuity relation between boundaries. 
Such a relation is mentioned in various places:  
[what is present] cannot exist without a relation of 
continuity [Kontinualrelation] to what is earlier or later and it 
is thereby connected with things which are separated from it, 
some by a greater and some by a lesser interval. The interval 
may be conceived to be as small as you please but not 
infinitely small. (Brentano1995b, 355) 
One thing is easy to see, namely, that the point which 
belongs to a spatial continuum […] is something only in virtue 
of belonging to the continuum. The relational character of the 
continuum is essential to it. Anyone who conceives of it must 
conceive of it as something in a continual relation of this sort 
[ein solches kontinuales Relativ]. (Brentano1995b, 356 italics 
original; see also p. 361) 
we certainly can conceive a continuum as a continuous 
multiplicity [Vielheit]. Indeed we can conceive it as a 
continuous multiplicity of boundaries. The boundaries do not 
exist in and for themselves and therefore no boundary can 
itself be an actual thing [ein Reales]. But boundaries stand in 
continuous relation [kontinuierlicher Verbindung] with other 
boundaries and are real to the extent that they truly contribute 
to the reality of the continuum. (Brentano 1981b, 55 my 
italics) 
Actually, the Aristotelian table of relations needs to be 
extended. I am thinking of the relation of continuity which 
holds between a boundary and the continuum it bounds. 
(Brentano 1981b, 188)  
The last quote suggests that the relation of continuity to which Brentano 
appeals is primitive. That there must be a primitive continuity-relation is 
a natural suggestion in view of Brentano’s recurring worry that other 
accounts of continuity always end up presupposing continuity (as I have 
argued, this objection applies to his own coincidence-based account). 
The best and perhaps only way to avoid circularity worries of this sort is 
to introduce primitive continuity.  
How Brentano intends to reconcile a primitivist approach to 
continuity with the coincidence-based account considered so far is 
unclear to me. Two rival account of continuity seem to co-exist in his 
works, although the primivist account is admittedly less salient. My 
proposal is to apply these two accounts of continuity to different 
continua. That is, one should explain secondary continua in terms of the 
coincidence relation, and one should take the continuity of primary 
continua to be primitive. 
What is, however, the relation of primitive continuity that gets us 
what we want?  Qua primitive, the relation cannot be defined, and is in 
that sense doomed to frustrate those who were yearning for a reductive 
account of continuity. But the Kontinualrelation can nevertheless be 
described, categorized (it is a relation) and contrasted with other 
relations. The continuity relation, I suggest, takes boundaries and puts 
them at a distance from each other and in continuity with each other. 
More specifically:  
1. Relata of continuity. The first option is that the continuity relation 
takes two boundaries: “b1 and b2 stand in relation of continuity”. 
The second option is that “continuity” takes a plurality of 
boundaries: “The Bs stand in relation of continuity with each 
other”. The three first quotes above, together with (i) Brentano’s 
defence of multiplicities (Brentano 1981b, 189) and (ii) his 
explicit admission of plural predication (Brentano 1981b, 155) 
suggest that he favours the plural reading over the pairwise 
reading. In many places Brentano also uses a third (compatible) 
way of predicating continuity, which takes on the one hand a 
single boundary, and on the other a “continuous multiplicity of 
boundary” —i.e. a continuum. He thus speaks in the last quote 
above of “the relation of continuity which holds between the 
boundary and the continuum it bounds” (1981:128, see also 1981: 
200) or says that “each boundary point is nothing except in 
continuity with a host of other boundary points” (1995a, 112).  
2. The continuity relation builds in distance between boundaries. 
Brentano notes that the continuity relation is distinct from the 
contiguity relation (1988: 104). Unlike the contiguity relation, 
which is explained in terms of coincidence and which relates 
superposed boundaries, the continuity relation is laden with 
“distance” or “intervals”(1988: 173): boundaries that stand in the 
continuity relation to each other are thereby at a certain distance 
from each other–they cannot be coincident. Primitive continuity 
ensures there is some non-zero distance between boundaries, 
which coincidence fails to do.  
3. The continuity relation grounds the infinite divisibility of continua. 
Although he rejects gunk, Brentano seems willing to accept the 
infinite divisibility of continua (“[the continuum] is made up to 
infinity of smaller and smaller parts, and again”, 1988, 108). I 
suggest that the continuity relation, because it is laden with 
distance, grounds infinite divisibility. That is: for any multiplicity 
of boundaries standing in the continuity relation, there are sub-
multiplicities of boundaries standing in continuity relation.  
4. The continuity relation is distinct from the dependence relation. 
To the extent that the continuity relation builds in distance 
between the boundaries it relates, continuity is distinct from the 
formal relation of dependence. Bi-lateral dependencies can relate 
entities without entailing anything about their distance.  
If continuity and dependence are distinct, how are they related?  I 
suggest locating the primitive continuity relation within the scope 
of the dependence relation, more precisely, within the dependee:  
Any boundary depends on its standing relation of 
continuity with what it bounds.10   
With this primitive continuity relation in hand, the continuity of primary 
continua can then be accounted for as follows:  
Primitive continuity account(PC): A primary continuum is a 
multiplicity of boundaries standing in a relation of continuity to each 
other, such that  
1. The continuity relation (i) is primitive; (ii) takes multiplicities 
of boundaries; (iii) is distance laden and hence distinct from 
coincidence; (iv) grounds infinite divisibility; (v) is distinct 
from inseparability/dependence.  
2. The boundaries have no thickness (like points) but (unlike 
points) ontologically depend on their being continuously 
related to the other boundaries of the continuum they bound.  
Let me address three questions that the proposal may raise.  
1. Is the continuity relation gunk in disguise?  We saw that Brentano 
was reluctant to add any another ingredient to his continua, and, 
in particular, that he rejects gunk. But insofar as continuity 
grounds extension and infinite divisibility how different is it from 
gunk?  I suggest that the continuity relation is basically gunk 
turned into a property –there is therefore an important truth in 
Zimmerman’s bounded-gunk reading. The continuity-relation 
plays the same role in the present proposal as gunk in the bounded-
gunk account: like gunk, primitive continuity brings in extension 
and divisibility. But unlike gunk, continuity is a relation between 
boundaries, not an entity or substance between them. Rather than 
saddling the realm of substances with extended gunk, the present 
proposal saddles the realm of relations with a primitive relation of 
continuity.11  
                                                
10Analogously, in the case of colours and extension the filling relation should be put 
within the dependee:  
• Any colour depends on its filling an extent.  
(See Correia 2006, 76-77 for related considerations to the effect that “x needs Fs in 
order to exist” often if not always means “x needs to be related in a certain way to Fs 
in order to exist”) 
11One may object that such an account boils down to the view that continuous 
multiplicities of boundaries are gunky, because they are extended and infinitely 
This distinction matters for two reasons. First, because the source 
of continuity is in the relation between boundaries rather than in 
some substance or gunk in-between, PC can rescue Brentano’s 
claim that boundaries are the only ingredients of continua. We get 
extension and continuity from boundaries not by adding a new 
ingredient such as gunk but by imposing a new structure: 
continuity relations between boundaries. 
Second, the appeal to continuity relations rather than gunk can 
avoid the pitfalls of the bounded-gunk account. Recall that the 
bounded-gunk account entails that the gunk filling the boundaries, 
once abstracted from the boundaries, begins yet has no beginning 
point —an absurdity for Brentano. By contrast, under PC the 
problem does not even arise. For while it makes sense to ask 
“Where does gunk-minus-the-boundaries-it-fills start?”, it makes 
no sense to ask “Where does the continuity-relation-minus-the-
boundaries-it-relates start?”. The continuity-relation and the 
boundaries it relates are not spatially adjacent —by contrast with 
boundaries and the gunk that fills them. For the same reason, the 
problem of explaining contact between boundaries and their 
interiors, which plagued the bounded-gunk account, does not even 
arise for PC.  
2. Is the continuity-relation the relation of distance? Is there a 
difference between standing in a continuity relation and standing 
in a distance relation?  I am inclined to think that, as far as 
boundaries of primary continua are concerned, being at a distance 
from entails being continuous with. One might first think that 
distance is not sufficient for continuity on the grounds that things 
at a distance from each other can be (and often are) separated by 
gaps –after all, discrete space is taken to be metaphysically 
possible (see Weyl 2009). But such a possibility hardly makes 
sense in the case of primary continua. First, for reasons that are 
now familiar, the existence of gaps in a continuum entails that the 
continuum in question is not primary: for there to be gaps, there 
must be some underlying continua, capable of being filled, on the 
background of which such discontinuities can arise. Second, even 
if gaps in primary continua were possible, it is arguable that 
boundaries on both sides of these gaps would not be at a distance 
                                                
divisible. However, while gunk is usually conceived of as some substance that is 
primitively extended and infinitely divisible, on the present account, by contrast, the 
gunky features—extension and divisibility— are grounded in more fundamental facts: 
boundaries standing in relations of continuity. 
from each other, but simply belong to different primary continua, 
in the same way that a location in space is not at a distance from a 
point in time.  
3. Is the relation of primitive continuity, so characterised, the one 
Brentano appeals to?  Nearly. Brentano clearly accepts the first 
two features, and is sympathetic towards the third. But he appears 
to reject the fourth feature. He indeed tends to equate “the relation 
of continuity which holds between the boundary and the 
continuum it bounds” (1981: 200) with the crossing of 
dependencies which on his account also relate the boundary and 
the continuum (see section 2.3 above). The last quote above 
continues:  
Actually, the Aristotelian table of relations needs to be 
extended. I am thinking of the relation of continuity 
which holds between a boundary and the continuum it 
bounds. Indeed that which exists in time exists only as 
a boundary. But just as it is certain that there are 
boundaries and that they must be included among 
things, it is also certain that a boundary is not a thing 
existing in itself [nicht etwas für sich Bestehendes]. The 
boundary could not exist unless it belonged as a 
boundary to a continuum. Hence it would seem to be 
the case both that the continuum is conditioned by the 
boundary and also that the boundary is conditioned by 
the continuum. Indeed, the boundary is conditioned in 
its nature by the continuum; thus a point differs in kind 
depending upon whether it belongs to a circle or to a 
straight line that is a tangent of the circle. We are 
dealing here with a unique type of causal relation, 
which we may call the relation of continuity 
[Kontinual-relation] (1981: 128; see also pp. 200-201)  
Likewise, in Raum, Zeit und Continuum:  
To the class of causal relations there belongs everything 
that somehow conditions the being of a thing or is 
conditioned by it. […] continual causation is (where we 
are not dealing with contiguity) a mutual causation 
between a boundary and what it bounds. (1988, 104)  
Brentano’s talk of “causal relation” may at first be found surprising. 
However, Brentano uses “causal” in a more encompassing sense than we 
do today. In Brentano’s use, “causal” relations include the relation of 
parthood, the relations between substance and accident, or the relation 
of ontological dependence between boundaries and the continua they 
bound (1981: 201-2). 
The upshot is that Brentano fails to clearly distinguish the dependency 
relations between boundaries and what they bound from the continuity 
relations between boundaries. This is a problem because one cannot get 
the relation of continuity, which incorporates distance, from a formal 
relation like dependence12 . Dependencies, however tight and interwoven, 
will never yield continuity. The account of primary continua requires 
therefore at least two distinct relations between boundaries and continua: 
continuity and dependence.  
For all its virtues, PC leaves us with one natural Brentanian worry: 
how are we to account for contact between primary continua, if not by 
coincidence?  The question splits into two: (i) how are we to account for 
contact between regions of space?  (ii) how are we to account for contact 
between boundaries?   
1. Contact between regions. A natural answer to the first question is 
that regions of space are in contact iff they have boundaries in 
common. Contact between regions of space (or spans of time) is 
accounted for not by coincidence of boundaries, but by sharing of 
boundary. As noticed above, the chief problem for the boundary 
sharing account of contact –which is avoided by boundary 
coincidence accounts– stems from breakage. But in the case of 
primary continua this objection does not even get off the ground, 
for breaks in space do not make sense (if you think they do, then 
perhaps you conceive of space as a secondary continuum on the 
background of some more fundamental primary continuum. That 
background primary continuum in which breakage occurs cannot 
itself be broken).  
2. Contact between boundaries. What is it, then, for two boundaries 
of space to be in contact?  I suggest that this is the place to part 
                                                
12There is arguably another instance of such a conflation between dependence and 
neighbouring material relations in Brentano’s writings. Brentano characterises the 
relation between qualitative determinations —such as colours— and spatial 
determinations in much the same way as he characterises the relations between 
continua and their boundaries: while colour depends individually on location, location 
depends generically on colour. To characterise this mutual dependence between colours 
and extension, Brentano says that they are “mutually pervading parts” or that “These 
parts do not appear in a spatial manner side by side but are tied completely differently, 
in that they, one might say, penetrate one another” (1995a: 20). This suggests that  he 
thinks of the dependency relation as building in the filling relation. 
way with the idea that continuity always requires contact. On the 
proposed account, boundaries of primary continua can —and 
must— stand in continuity with each other without being in 
contact with each other. The reason for this is, as I argued, that 
two boundaries of space cannot be in contact with each other 
without being one and the same.  
Summing up, all we have in primary continua are non-coinciding 
boundaries, however near, standing in continuity relations. Coincidence 
of boundaries is nowhere to be found among the boundaries constituting 
space or time. Coincidence is however ubiquitous when we turn our 
attention towards concrete secondary continua: things that are in space. 
But there is still a third kind of continua, abstract secondary continua, 
which we finally have to deal with. 
4.2.  Abstract secondary continua: primitive 
similarity  
Brentano’s talk of “secondary continua” tends to collapse two different 
sorts of secondary continua with respect to continuous transitions:  
1. The colour space, which is an abstract quality space. Just like 
“colour is something from which the geometer abstracts” (1988: 
21), space is something from which the scientist interested in the 
nature of colour abstracts. Although the colour space he reaches 
by bracketing spatial differences can only be represented in space 
(for instance, by a three-dimensional colour solid) or in space and 
time (such as when a shape continuously changes its colour), the 
colour space by itself is free of spatial and temporal 
determinations. When ordering colours, we try to abstract from 
such determinations —colours are not more or less similar 
depending on the space or time they occupy. Hence, although the 
colour space is a secondary continuum —for colours depend on 
extension— it is a simple and abstract continuum.  
2. The coloured space, by contrast, is the concrete and colourful 
space we see. It is a double continuum formed by the encountering 
of two simple and abstract continua: the colour space and the 
(geometer’s) space (Figure 9). 
  
 Figure 9:  Kinds of continua 
 
I have argued that the continuity of the coloured space should be 
explained in terms of boundary coincidence, and that the continuity of 
space should be explained in terms of boundary sharing and a primitive 
relation of continuity. Our question is now how to explain the continuity 
of the colour space. Note first that although the colour space is a 
secondary continuum (because it depends on primary continua) it 
displays several striking similarities to the primary continua of time and 
space.  
• First, the colour space is, like primary space, a simple continuum 
(it is one of the ingredients of the coloured space which is therefore 
a multiple continuum).  
• Second, the colour space is, like primary space for Brentano, an 
abstraction: to reach it we need to abstract from the primary 
continuum of space. Only double continua are concrete.  
• Third, the colour space, again like primary continua, has a 
constant teleosis. There is no acceleration within the colour space. 
It is only when a portion of the colour space is projected within 
primary space, giving rise to the multiple coloured space, that 
variations in teleosis can occur. Variations in teleosis consist in 
some simple secondary continua being projected heterogeneously 
within some primary continua. For instance, in Figure 7 above, the 
red-to-blue portion of the colour space is projected 
homogeneously into space in the first figure. In the second figure, 
by contrast, a greater portion of the simple red-to-blue colour 
continua is projected towards to middle. The reason why coloured 
space can have varying teleosis is not that it is a secondary 
continuum, but that is a double continuum. Because the colour 
space is simple, its teleosis cannot vary.  
Brentano insightfully pointed out a difference between continua 
with fixed and varying degrees of teleosis. What he should have 
said, however, is not that secondary continua, unlike primary 
continua, can have varying teleosis, but rather that double 
continua, unlike simple continua (primary or secondary), can have 
varying teleosis.  
• Fourth, like the inner boundaries of space, the boundaries of the 
colour space have full plerosis. In the same way that the present 
bounds in two directions (contrary to a beginning, which bounds 
in just one direction, but pertains to multiple continua), or in the 
same way that a spatial point bounds in all the directions around 
it, any determinate shade within the colour space bounds all over 
it13. 
• Fifth, relatedly it is hard to see how any coincidence of boundaries 
could occur in the colour space: what would it be for two different 
determinate shades of red to occupy the same place in the colour 
space?  Colour-shades are the places in the colour continua. 
Granting that two colours can be at the same place in the colour-
space would amount to granting, absurdly, that two places in that 
space can be in the same place. 
How then should we account for the continuity of the colour space?  
Given the many similarities with primary space, a natural suggestion is 
that, like primary space, the colour space consists in a multiplicity of 
boundaries; i.e., a multiplicity of determinate colour shades, standing in 
a relation of primitive continuity to each other. Relatedly, as with 
primary space, two regions of the colour space are in contact iff they 
share a boundary (a determinate colour); and points in the colour space 
can never be in contact with each other –for if they were to coincide, 
they would be one and the same determinate colour. 
Interestingly, the primitive relation of continuity between 
determinate colour shades is more familiar than the primitive relation 
linking spatial boundaries. I suggest that it is nothing other than the 
                                                
13 There is however one respect at least in which colour space importantly differs from 
space and time. Since colour space is limited or finite, it will have external 
boundaries. What they are will depend on how the colour space is construed —
perhaps the colour spaces has corners (see Mulligan 1991), in which case not all 
boundaries of the colour space have full plerosis. 
relation of brute inexact similarity14. One key feature of primitive 
continuity is that it is laden with distance. In the case of spatial 
boundaries, these distances are spatial distances. In the case of 
determinate colours, these distances must consist in various degrees of 
similarity –that is, in various distances within a resemblance order. That 
primitive continuity is, in the case of quality spaces, identical with brute 
inexact similarity, may help render the otherwise unconventional idea of 
a primitive relation of continuity more familiar.  
The analogies and differences between kinds of continua and 
continuities according to this neo-Brentananian account are recapped in 
table 1.15 
 
 
Table 1: Varieties of continuities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14See Massin 2013 for a defense of such an account of determinables in terms of brute 
similarity. 
15 I am grateful to Sébastien Gandon, Guillaume Fréchette, Carlo Ierna, Robin 
McKenna, Kevin Mulligan, Jonathan Shaheen, Barry Smith, as well as to audiences 
in Clermont-Ferrand, Prague and Lugano for very helpful comments. 
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